Tatar Brothers

Erdogan under pressure over threat to Tatars in Ukraine

Turkey is increasingly caught between a rock and a hard place as the crisis to its north in Ukraine threatens to slide toward civil war, and the actual civil war to its south in Syria moves in a direction it never expected, with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gradually reconsolidating his position militarily. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s warning in a Bloomberg interview that Ukraine is sliding into civil war has heightened concerns in Ankara.

Turkey, already suffering negative fallout from the Syrian conflict, is bracing itself for the possibility of another, similar conflict near its borders that is bound to have negative political, social and economic consequences. Ankara has been trying to sustain a delicate balance between Moscow and Kiev since the Crimean crisis broke in March, but it is aware that the balance might tip if events in eastern Ukraine get further out of hand and turn into a Yugoslavia-type bloody conflict.

Despite this balancing act, Turkey continues to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity and has refused to recognize the results of the referendum held in Crimea in March that enabled Moscow to wrest control of the peninsula from Kiev. Ankara has similarly refused to recognize the results of the referendum held in eastern Ukraine by separatist Russians on May 11. “The illegal referendum held in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Lugansk on 11 May 2014 and its possible outcomes are null and void and are not recognized by Turkey,” read a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry.

Ankara also continues to express concern over the fate of Crimean Tatars, a Turkic group that has historically had bad relations with Russia and Russians. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed the matter with Vladimir Putin in a phone conversation in April, reportedly telling the Russian president that “Turkey attaches great importance to the Tatars’ well-being and security.”

Their conversation took place days after Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Abdulcemil Kirimoglu visited Ankara and called on Erdogan to intercede with Putin on behalf of the Tatars. News of this high-level exchange between Ankara and Moscow coincided with Putin telling Russian media that he would sign a decree “for rehabilitation of Crimean Tatar people.” These developments, however, did not prevent Kirimoglu — declared a “national hero” of the Crimean Tatars and presented the Medal of State by Turkish President Abdullah Gul in April — from being banned from entering Crimea.

Concerns in Ankara about the fate of Crimean Tatars mounted when Crimean Prosecutor General Natalia Poklonskaya opened an investigation into the activities of the National Assembly of the Crimean Tatar People, accusing it of “engaging in radical and illegal mass activities” in various parts of the peninsula. The issue remains a sensitive matter between Ankara and Moscow, and there are reports that Tatars have begun to flee the peninsula. Turkish officials are also concerned that if a civil war erupts in Ukraine between nationalists and separatist Russians, it could further endanger the 200,000 Tatars in Crimea.

There are also fears that the Tatars may end up with no place to go but Turkey, leaving the Erdogan government, already burdened with almost a million refugees from Syria, with a new wave of refugees, this time from the north. The government, facing a host of difficulties at home for a number of reasons (the latest involving the mining tragedy in Soma), also has to factor in domestic public reactions and political ramifications if the safety and well-being of the Tatars is seen to be in danger.

This is not the only potential problem Turkey faces in the event of a civil war in Ukraine that many expect will involve Russia directly or indirectly. Turkey is heavily dependent on energy from Russia, importing more than 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, which amounts to a quarter of its total gas requirements and is delivered via a pipeline through Ukraine. Any disruption in the flow of gas will result in a serious energy shortage for Turkey and add to the government’s woes. In light of this, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz recently warned Moscow, asserting that gas sanctions on Ukraine by Russia will be seen in Ankara as sanctions imposed against Turkey.

“We believe that deep-scaled interstate relations between Turkey and Russia will prevent such a mistake,” Yildiz told reporters during a visit to Tbilisi, Georgia. He also reminded Moscow that sanctions against Ukraine would result in Russia losing some $11 billion in revenue from gas sales to Turkey.

The Turkish straits and the passage of warships by Turkey’s NATO allies is another touchy subject between Turkey and Russia that could flare up in the event of war in Ukraine. Ankara and Moscow recently exchanged barbs after Russia accused Turkey of violating the Montreux Convention on the straits by allowing US battleships to stay in the Black Sea for longer than the time allowed under the convention.

While the Ukraine crisis is fraught with potential risks and threats for Turkey, the Syrian crisis remains an intractable problem for Ankara and presents actual threats. The refugee problem continues to grow, leaving Turkish authorities with few answers. The very real possibility that Assad might prevail adds to the Erdogan government’s other headaches.

An increasing number of analysts are suggesting that the predominantly Sunni refugees who fled Syria for Turkey are unlikely to return to a country run by Assad. There is now talk of “Turkey’s new Syrian minority,” since it is unlikely that the government, even if it wanted to, could force people that it warmly welcomed to go back to their country. It is also clear that Ankara will have to foot the bill of taking care of this new minority until it is integrated into Turkey and able to look after its own needs, which could take years.

The possibility of tensions between locals and the Syrians, as some recent incidents illustrate, cannot be discounted. There is also the risk of radical jihadist elements within this minority using Turkey as a staging area to hit at the Assad regime with terrorism. Ankara has already been criticized for supporting some of these groups. The possibility of retaliatory attacks being staged in Turkey by rival jihadists, not to mention elements close to the Assad regime, also has to be factored into the equation.

Such unsavory prospects were brought home by the May 15 explosion near the Bab al-Salameh border crossing between Turkey and Syria that killed as many as 29 people according to the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. In May 2013, a twin car bombing in the Turkish border town of Reyhanli left at least 51 people dead and nearly 150 wounded, a violent reminder of what Turkey could face as a result of the Syrian crisis. The government hastily blamed pro-Assad elements for that attack and arrested a number of people, but the opposition continues to assert it was carried out by Sunni jihadist extremists.

Perhaps the truth about Reyhanli will never be known, but Turks are concerned that similar attacks, especially by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), could take place as the crisis in Syria continues to fester. There is also, of course, the issue of how Ankara will cope politically with an Assad regime that has reconsolidated its power while remaining an enemy of Turkey because of the Erdogan government’s overtly pro-Sunni approach to the crisis.

These are issues that Erdogan will have to face as soon as he can lift his head from tending to domestic politics, which are becoming increasingly tense in the lead-up to the August presidential elections. There is, in short, the distinct possibility, given current developments, that the crises to Turkey’s north and south will grow in the meantime, making the situation even harder for Turkey to manage by the time Erdogan is elected president, as many believe he will be although he has not officially announced his candidacy.